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Introduction
Northern Ireland as a site of significant conflict and violence has come a long way.
Key political developments in the form of The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement
(1998) ushered in a democratically elected Assembly `` inclusive in its membership,
capable of exercising executive and legislative authority and subject to safeguards to
protect the rights and interest of all sides of the community'' (page 5). Devolution
became a reality in December 1999 when the Northern Ireland Assembly and its
Executive Committee of Ministers assumed powers of self-government under the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Knox and Carmichael, 2005). However, there were faltering
periods of devolution between 1999 and October 2002, at which point the Assembly was
suspended for the fourth time due to a lack of trust and loss of confidence between key
political stakeholders.With the eventual return to devolution in May 2007 (following the
St Andrews Agreement), Northern Ireland is experiencing its first consistent period of
devolved administrative stability in which the two key protagonists in the conflict
[Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fe¨in] share executive and legislative
powers.
Political parties claim key successes associated with devolution: free public trans-
port is available to everyone over 60; local property taxes or rates have been frozen;
proposed water charges have been postponed; prescription charges have been abol-
ished; and there has been a major investment in infrastructure projects in schools,
roads, and hospitals. Policing and justice, the so-called `final piece in the devolution
jigsaw', has been devolved (April 2010) to the Northern Ireland Assembly and all five
main political parties operate a mandatory power-sharing coalition. To capture this
political momentum, Derry (Londonderry) celebrated winning its bid to be the first
UK City of Culture in 2013. This is not to suggest unbridled optimism. There remains a
rump of dissident republican activists who have perpetrated acts of violence which
appear to be escalating at the time of writing. Yet the long-term trend in violence is
undoubtedly downwards: compare five recorded deaths due to the security situation in
2009 with 470 at the height of the `troubles' in 1972 (PSNI, 2010). Northern Ireland has
taken its share of the pain under UK-wide public expenditure cuts of »6 billion in
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2010/11 announced by the Conservative ^ Liberal Democrat coalition. Some »130m has
been cut from the Northern Ireland budget (»10.3 b) which will impact significantly on
a region where over 30% of the total work force is employed in the public sectorötotal
cuts over a four-year period (2011 ^ 15) will amount to »4 billion.
Notwithstanding the significant political achievements in Northern Ireland, it
remains a deeply segregated society. Around 90% of children attend either Protestant
(controlled) or Catholic (maintained) schools; more than 70% of social housing estates
are 90% single community occupied; and interface barriers between communities, or
so called `peace walls', have multipliedöin the Belfast area alone there are eighty-eight
security and segregation barriers (Community Relations Council, 2009). To add to this
culture of segregation and intolerance, racist incidents have increased from 813 in
2004/05 to 1038 in 2009/10 earning Northern Ireland the unenviable title of `` race
hate capital of Europe'' (Chrisafis, 2004, page 1). Yet one of the key goals of the
devolved government is to work towards `` a shared and better future for all'' (Northern
Ireland Executive, 2008, page 6).
The aim of this paper is to examine what is meant by a `shared and better future for
all', a laudable goal but one which lacks reference to specific social and public policy
priorities or wider research on community cohesion. I attempt to do this in a number
of ways. First, I locate recent proposals for a shared and better future in a policy
context and in the literature on community cohesion. Second, I interrogate, using
attitudinal data, people's perception of `normality' in Northern Ireland and the extent
to which they see government playing an active role in encouraging a shared society.
Finally, I consider two initiatives in education and housing which illustrate attempts to
operationalise a shared and better future for Northern Ireland. I conclude with some
thoughts on whether Northern Ireland is moving to an intercultural society. The
intended contribution to the literature is twofold. At a conceptual level I interrogate
the `separate but equal' policy which underpins the highly segregated population that is
Northern Ireland by drawing lessons from interculturalism which has its roots in
Que¨bec's policy of `reasonable accommodation' and, more recently, a white paper on
the same topic from the Council of Europe. At an empirical level, I conduct an analysis
of survey data which explores future preferences for the kind of society Northern
Ireland people want to live in.
The policy context
The most recent attempts to promote the goal of a shared and better future centred
on two policy documents: A Shared Future (OFMdFM, 2005) and the consultation
document Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (OFMdFM, 2010). The
former was devised by British Ministers during the direct rule (from Westminster) era
and the latter has emerged after protracted negotiations between Sinn Fe¨in and the
DUP who squabbled openly about its content.
The Shared Future policy document, drawing on extensive public consultation,
argued that there was overwhelming support for a shared society in Northern Ireland
(Hughes, 2009). Its underpinning principles were rooted in The Belfast or Good Friday
Agreement (1998, page 18) which claimed that `` an essential aspect of the reconciliation
process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including
initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.'' The
policy document was emphatic in its tone:
‘‘Separate but equal is not an option. Parallel living and the provision of parallel
services are unsustainable both morally and economically ... . No one is arguing for
an artificially homogeneous Northern Ireland and no one will be asked to suppress
or give up their chosen identity. However, the costs of a divided society, whilst
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recognising, of course, the very real fears of people around safety and security
considerations, are abundantly clear ...'' (OFMdFM, 2005, page 15).
To illustrate the consequences of segregation, an empirical study was commis-
sioned by the (direct rule) government to consider the financial cost of the Northern
Ireland divide (Deloitte, 2007). The research concluded that an additional »1.5 billion
per annum is spent on public services than a comparable region where such segrega-
tion did not exist. Set within the context of a »10.3 billion devolved budget (2010/11),
this is a major drain on public resources.
Despite the direct rule administration's commitment to A Shared Future and
evidence of the high costs of a divided society, the policy was abandoned by the
devolved Executive. Notwithstanding, the (then) First Minister (Ian Paisley) defended
the role of his department, the Office of the First Minister and the deputy First
Minister (OFMdFM), arguing that it was totally committed to promoting equality
and human rights. More generally, Dr Paisley pointed to the fact that the Executive
recognised the importance of creating a shared society through ministers' affirmation
in their pledge of office that they will promote the interests of the entire country which
are represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly and work towards the goal of a
shared future. Sinn Fe¨in argued against the whole basis of A Shared Future claiming
that it defined the primary problem as a lack of tolerance between communities
particularly in socially deprived areas, rather than tackling disadvantage on the basis
of objective need and addressing structural inequalities. It absolved the government
from any responsibilities and redirected the problem towards the two main communi-
ties which were `blamed' because they simply could not coexist. A Shared Future
became a casualty of policies tainted by association with the direct rule era which
the devolved government was keen to distance itself from and start afresh.
It is within this context that the OFMdFM (2010) launched a consultation docu-
ment Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration which set out the Northern
Ireland Executive's vision for the future by challenging the assumption that division
and segregation is a `normal' pattern of living. The junior minister in the OFMdFM
announced at the launch:
‘‘Cohesion, Sharing and Integration will be the catalyst to make a difference to the
lives of people and the experiences of communities across our society. We will also
provide and expand shared spaces and services and tackle all forms of hate crime
and intimidation. We will work together to build a society where people can live,
work and socialise in safe, shared and accessible facilities. We want a future based
on sharing, equality, respect and understanding'' (Kelly, 2010, page 1).
The document lists a number of goals for achieving a shared and better future for
all. The intention is that the OFMdFM will drive the agenda by coordinating input
from all government departments and agencies (eg district councils, community, and
voluntary sector) involved in its delivery. The importance attached to the programme
by the Executive is signalled by the fact that its implementation will be overseen by a
ministerial panel chaired by OFMdFM ministers, and key statutory and community
partners, and cross-departmental activities will be coordinated through a senior
officials' steering group.
Notwithstanding the responses to the consultation process, the Executive lists a
number of `themes for action which are already clear'. These include:
. Ensuring that good relations considerations are embedded within all government
policy making.
. Reducing and eventually eliminating segregated services.
. Addressing interfaces and encouraging shared neighbourhoods.
Cohesion, sharing, and integration in Northern Ireland 3
Responses to the government's proposals have been mostly negativeöbest captured
by one political commentator who described them as `` aspirational or motherhood and
apple pie'' (Davenport, 2010). This reaction reflects wider criticism that Cohesion,
Sharing and Integration fails to set targets or dates for measurable progress and does
not mention any financial commitment on the part of government. As one newspaper
editorial described it: ``the proposed programme suggests that the Executive has set out
to manage, rather than eradicate, sectarianism'' (Irish News 2010, page 10). In short, it is
a woolly benign document and one which offers little by way of specific and measurable
objectives, policy priorities, or an implementation strategy. It is the product of a
political consensus between the DUP and Sinn Fe¨in replete with good intentions but
lacking in specificity.
The literature
Although billed as a consultation document on Cohesion, Sharing and Integration
(OFMdFM, 2010), it is surprising that there is no mention of the wider political and
academic discourse on social cohesion both within Great Britain and beyond. It offers
no definitions of what the key terms mean or a contextual analysis of the problems of
segregation in Northern Ireland. The document is wholly insular. One can only assume
that there is, given the title, some reference to the debate on community cohesion in
Great Britain which followed the street disturbances in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham
in 2001 (Conway, 2009; Eatwell, 2006, Flint and Robinson, 2008; Gavrielides, 2010;
Harris and Young, 2009; Kalra and Kapoor; 2009; Thomas, 2007; Worley, 2005). The
outbreak of violence, stoked by National Front activities, involved racial abuse between
whites and young Asian men that led to stabbings and police using riot control
measures (Denham, 2001; Ouseley, 2001). A report into the causes of these disturban-
ces found that people were living `parallel lives' and recommended ways to tackle
segregation and promote community cohesion:
‘‘Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment,
places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many com-
munities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do
not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful
interchanges'' (Community Cohesion Independent Review Team, 2001, page 9).
Self-segregation, according to Cantle (the Chair of the review team), did not provide
the basis for a harmonious community and unless this was addressed it would lead to
more serious problems in the long term.
The Cantle report also made the point, however, that ethnic segregation was also
an issue in nonfaith schools. These claims of self-segregation have been robustly
challenged by Finney and Simpson (2009) who disagreed that the extent of separation
by religious affiliation or ethnic identity in Britain amounted to parallel lives. They
argued that this presupposed an unwillingness on the part of minorities to integrate
which encouraged cultural conflict, yet their research evidence disproved this assertion.
They challenged the Commission for Racial Equality's assertion (2005) that Britain is
`` sleepwalking to segregation'' (young people from ethnic minorities were twice as
likely to have a circle of friends exclusively from their own community) as `` alarmist
language and false claim to scientific rigour to create a striking message about friend-
ship groups, unsupported by the evidence, of dangerous inward-looking communities,
harbingers of a bleak future for the UK'' (Finney and Simpson, 2009, page 99). In a
critique of their work Cantle (2009) argued that trends in segregation cannot be
definitively concluded because the 2001 Census data are out of date and other recent
research is too limited to draw conclusions.
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The parallel-lives quotation (above) could apply in equal measure to Northern
Ireland today where segregation is the norm. Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) describe a
number of social factors which impact on the nature of segregation in Northern
Irelandöin particular, interface communities. Few people worked and travelled in
areas dominated by the `other' community, the latter for fear of being attacked. In
some cases people wanted to `support' their own community by spending money
thereinöshopping elsewhere could be seen as being disloyal. In addition, ``there is a
real sense of prejudice and a desire to reduce the potential for contact with the `other'
community'' (page 90). Are there lessons from Britain's experience of community
cohesion?
The community cohesion debate has evolved since 2001 and been sustained by
more recent issues around immigration policy, the electoral success of the far-right
party (British National Party), and the fraught relationship between Islamic and British
identity (Flint, 2010). The discourse on community cohesion has widened and led to a
fundamental rethink on addressing the whole issue of cultural diversity. The model of
assimilation which suggested that minorities should adapt the predominant ethos
moved to one where cultures and religions could peacefully coexist. This evolved into
multiculturalism whereby minority cultures are considered equal to that of the majority
community and separation, rather than assimilation, was deemed acceptable. Commu-
nity cohesion was seen as a move away from multiculturalism in which coexistence
resulted in some communities living in isolation with little or no interaction. A more
recent contribution to the narrative has been provided by the Council of Europe which
espouses a policy of interculturalism.
The terms multiculturalism and interculturalism require explication here. Todd
(1994, page 216) argues that multiculturalism is `` the harmonious coexistence of differ-
ing cultural or ethnic groups in a pluralist society.'' Multicultural public policies aim to
`` maintain harmony between diverse ethnic groups and structure the relationships
between the state and ethnic minorities.'' Yet Rex (2010, page 217) argues that the
meaning of a multicultural society in Britain today `` remains remarkably obscure''.
Kymlicka (2010) charts the rise of, and retreat from, multiculturalism which in sum-
mary covers two broad phases of development. From 1970s to mid-1990s there was
`` a trend towards recognition and accommodation of diversity through policies and
minority rights.'' Since then, there have been ``fears amongst the majority group that
accommodation of diversity has gone too far and is threatening their way of life''
(page 97). He concludes that efforts at promoting multiculturalism were often naive
and its critique is largely `off target' because of the lack of attention to the conditions
for successful implementation.
This theme has been taken up recently by UK Prime Minister, David Cameron,
when he declared that multiculturalism has failed, echoing similar statements by
Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, arguing years of `` hands-off tolerance'' have
encouraged different cultures to live separate lives and created a fear of standing up
to the racism of minorities. He declared that ``we need a lot less passive tolerance of
recent years and a much more active muscular liberalism'' (Wright and Taylor, 2011,
page 1). In response, Mahood (2011) argued that, despite notices of the death of multi-
culturalism in the UK, heralded as far back as 1989 by the Salman Rusdie Satanic
Verses affair, it has flourished with the sanctioning of faith schools, religious discrim-
ination legislation, and bringing Muslims into the networks of governance. Mahood
suggested that `` we must not take for granted what we have in common, but work hard
to ensure that all citizens recognise themselves in our shared concept of citizenship''
(page 32).
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Interculturalism has its roots in the Que¨bec government's policy of integration and
is different from multiculturalism adopted since the early 1970s by other parts of
Canada. Multiculturalism as a model was not considered suitable for Que¨bec because
`` in English Canada there is less concern for the preservation of a founding cultural
tradition than for national cohesion'' (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008, page 39). A com-
mission was set up in Quebec in 2007 to examine public discontent over `reasonable
accommodation' practices related to cultural differences. The commission argued
that integration is a key component in Que¨bec's interculturalism model. In defining
interculturalism it noted, inter alia:
‘‘In a spirit of reciprocity, interculturalism strongly emphasizes interaction, in partic-
ular intercommunity action, with a view to overcoming stereotypes and defusing
fear or rejection of `the other', taking advantage of the enrichment that stems from
diversity, and benefiting from social cohesion'' (page 40).
In Europe this debate has been given focus through a white paper on intercultural
dialogue which asserts that `` old approaches to the management of cultural diversity
were no longer adequate'' (Council of Europe, 2008, page 9). The white paper goes on
to argue: `` whilst driven by benign intentions, multiculturalism is now seen by many as
having fostered communal segregation and mutual incomprehension.'' Instead, it sug-
gests combining elements of both into an emerging interculturalist approach which:
`` takes from assimilation the focus on the individual and from multiculturalism the
recognition of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, critical to integration
and social cohesion, of dialogue on the basis of equal dignity and shared values''
(page 19).
Two aspects of the community cohesion debate in Britain have particular reso-
nance with emerging policies on tackling segregation in Northern Irelandöintegrated
or shared education and mixed social housing. Cantle (2001) criticised the wisdom of
faith-based schools on the basis that outside of their homes education has a significant
influence on the lives of children. He recommended that at least 25% of places at faith-
based schools should be available to children of other faiths or none. This has not
happened; instead there has been an expansion of faith schools in Great Britain mainly
through the academy scheme. Proponents argue such an expansion is in response to
demands for greater parental choice; opponents claim faith schools lead to greater
segregation and deeper divisions within communities. The Conservative ^ Liberal
Democrats coalition government has reignited this debate under recent plans for
parents, teachers, charities, and faith groups to put in bids to run their own schools,
opening the door for the creation of more faith schools.
Research evidence from Great Britain on the experience of education and housing
in promoting community cohesion offers important lessons for Northern Ireland, not
least its tendency to ignore middle-class patterns of segregation and polarisation in
where they live and have their children educated (Amin, 2002; Phillips 2006). Flint
(2007) examined parallel developments in Catholic state schools in Scotland and the
Muslim state sector in England. He argued that minorities found it difficult to con-
tribute to definitions of a cohesive national identity and `legitimate' citizenship. Faith
schools were therefore `` an important element of the institutional architecture that
enables cultural identities to flourish and be protected'' (page 264). He refered to
measures to ameliorate the effects of religious and ethnic segregation effects on the
state education system (such as interschool twinning, better teacher training on
diversity issues) and concluded that `` faith schools simultaneously contribute to and
undermine different dimensions of community cohesion'' (page 264).
Robinson (2005) examined the role of mixed housing as a way of promoting com-
munity cohesion and questioned a number of assumptions which underpinned such a
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policy response. He considered, inter alia, the role that housing policy and provision
might play in promoting increased ethnic mix and the benefits of social interaction
assumed to flow from residential integration. Robinson drew attention to the con-
strained choices which inhabitants of segregated communities haveöminority ethnic
groups are more likely to live in socially deprived areas, be unemployed, and experience
poor health. The same is true in Northern Ireland. There is evidence that segregation is
correlated with levels of deprivation. Fourteen of the fifteen most deprived areas
in Belfast are highly segregated (OFMdFM, 2010, page 19). Robinson's research in
England concluded that `` it is questionable whether housing policy can effect change
in residential settlement patterns and promote increasing interethnic mix at the neigh-
bourhood level'' (2005, page 1425). In addition, he claimed that `` even if interethnic
residential integration can be actively promoted, it cannot be assumed that interethnic
interaction will inevitably follow.''
Robinson also criticised the wider community cohesion agenda: `` [it] has overblown
differences of ethnicity, is unwarranted in maintaining that the problem is with minority
ethnic communities and is wrong in many of the conclusions drawn to legitimatise the
specifics of the policy response'' (page 1412). Burnett (2004; 2007) echoed these
criticisms by arguing that the `` ideological basis of community cohesion is exclusionary''
in that the state has abdicated its responsibilities for fractured communities and through
community cohesion strategies shifted the onus back onto communities to deal with
problems originating from government neglect (Burnett, 2004, page 15). Flint (2010,
page 261) summarised the critique by arguing that `` the concept of community cohesion
has been subject to sustained criticism due to its alleged de-politicisation of race,
its limiting concept of cohesion and its assimilationist tendencies.''
Empirical analysis
Is the Northern Ireland consultation document Cohesion, Sharing and Integration
(OFMdFM, 2010) therefore based on a discredited or at least passe¨ premise for commu-
nity cohesion? A missing element in the devolved government's proposals for cohesion,
sharing, and integration is an assessment of people's attitudes to a postconflict policy
and whether we are moving from a segregated society which acknowledges and protects
the separate interests of the two main communities in Northern Ireland to a new form of
interculturalism (Amin, 2002). Is the government actively encouraging greater sharing?
Will moves towards greater `mixing' improve community cohesion and, if so, what
should the public and social policy priorities be to make this happen? In an effort to
make a contribution to this policy debate generated through the publication of Cohe-
sion, Sharing and Integration, I interrogate public attitudes to these questions and report
the analysis below in direct response.
My methodology is to conduct a secondary analysis using data from the 2009
Northern Ireland Life and Times survey to explore the questions posed above. The
survey sample size is 1089 respondents aged 18 or over selected using systematic random
sampling and the data were collected between October and December 2009.(1) The
sampling frame for participant selection is addresses from the register of the Land
and Property Services Agency in the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and
Personnel. This is the most up-to-date listing of private households and is made
available through to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research agency for research
purposes. Interviewers listed all members of the households eligible for inclusion and
randomly selected one adult per household in the sample. The margin of error for all
sample estimates is within the parameters of  2.8%.
(1) The data are available for further analysis from http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/
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(a) How do people perceive Northern Ireland?
The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2009) asked respondents their reactions
to a number of statements with the preamble `` people have ideas for the kind of society
Northern Ireland should become''. Respondents were then asked whether they thought
listed ideas had been achieved, one of which was as follows:
‘‘Northern Ireland is a normal civic society in which all individuals are equal, where
differences are resolved through dialogue and where all people are treated impartially.''
In each case respondents were asked to score their answers on a scale ranging from 1 to
10, where:
1  it has definitely not been achieved,
10  it definitely has been achieved.
The results of this question are displayed in figure 1.
The variable `normal civic society' is slightly positively skewed (skewness  0.063)
with scores clustered at the lower end of the scale as indicated by the trend line. This
suggests that people are less inclined to the view that ``Northern Ireland is a normal
civil society in which all individuals are equal'' with a mean value of 4.54 on a ten-point
scale and standard deviation of 2.1.
(b) Is the government encouraging a shared society?
Respondents were asked their opinion on the role which government was playing in
relation to promoting a shared society in Northern Ireland. The survey outlined the
following statement and sought respondents' views on the extent to which this had
been achieved:
‘‘The government is actively encouraging shared communities where people of all
backgrounds can live, work, learn and play together.''
The results are displayed in figure 2.
The variable `government encouraging a shared society' is slightly negatively
skewed (skewness  ÿ0.081) with scores clustered marginally at the higher end of the
scale as indicated by a flattish trend line. This suggests that people are fairly evenly
balanced on the view that `` government is actively encouraging shared communities''
with a mean value of 5.52 on a ten-point scale and standard deviation of 2.14.
Overall, therefore, respondents tended to think that, on balance, Northern Ireland is
not yet a normal civic society and that government is, to a limited extent, `` encouraging
shared communities''.
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Notes: N  1222; mean  4:54; standard deviation  2:099.
Figure.1. A normal civic society?
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These findings are also reflected in a qualitative study which looked at the impact
of segregation and sectarianism in Northern Ireland and found:
‘‘In some areas there are greater levels of mixing, sharing and integrating, while in
others the legacy of the past, of hostility, fear and mistrust dominate the wider
social environment. In most social environments the process of avoidance still
appears to dominate interactions between members of the two main communities''
(Hamilton et al, 2008, page 153).
While these data tell us about people's perceptions of the status quo, they offer little
normative insight into the kind of postconflict society they would like Northern Ireland
to become (multicultural or intercultural) and their policy preferences to achieve such
ambitions. It is to this that I now turn.
(c) Do people want a more integrated society?
At the general level the 2009 survey data indicate people's overwhelming support for
`mixing'. Respondents were asked the following question:
‘‘Some people think that better relations between Protestants and Catholics in
Northern Ireland will only come about through more mixing of the two commu-
nities. Others think that better relations will only come about through more
separation. Which comes closest to your views?''
Some 88% of respondents (total N  1095) indicated that better relations would result
from more mixing and only 3% suggested better relations would come from more
separation between the two main communities (the remainder of the respondents
`` could not choose'').
Did this significant level of support for mixing vary across different age groups,
community identities, and socioeconomic groupings? In other words, I am hypothesis-
ing that the variables age, religion, and socioeconomic grouping are important factors
in determining whether or not respondents want a more integrated society. I therefore
cross-tabulated the variable `` support for mixing'' with: age, religion, and social eco-
nomic grouping of the respondents to establish if there were significant associations.
The results were as follows:
. agemixing or separation: w2(5)  4.67, p40:05
. religionmixing or separation: w2(2)  2.56 , p40:05
. social economic groupingmixing or separation: w2(2)  15.4, p5 0:05, with
Cramer's V  0.12.
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Notes: N  1204; mean  5:52; standard deviation  2:142.
Figure 2. Encouraging a shared society?
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These results indicate that age and religion are statistically independent of respond-
ents' attitudes to greater mixing or separation. In other words, most respondents,
regardless of their age or religion, supported greater mixing over a segregated society.
There is, however, a significant association between social economic grouping and
attitudes to greater mixing and separation. In the case of these two variables the
Cramer's V statistic (0.12) tells us that the strength of the relationship is weak
(although unlikely to have happened by chance, p5 0:05). By examining the adjusted
residuals in the cross tabulation of the variables social economic grouping and mixing
or separation, it is clear that unskilled and unemployed respondents are more likely to
favour separation over mixing. Intuitively, this may be because they are already living
in highly segregated communities, perhaps at either side of `peace' walls, and their
experience is that physical separation equates to security and protection of their homes.
(d) What constitutes `greater mixing'?
So far these results tell us that people in Northern Ireland do not yet see it as a normal
civic society in which all individuals are treated equally and where differences are
resolved through dialogue. They express a high level of support for greater mixing
and believe that this will result in better relations between Protestants and Catholics.
This support for greater mixing is independent of people's age or religious background.
Respondents are evenly split on whether the government is actively encouraging shared
communities where people of all backgrounds can live, work, learn, and play together.
Given these results, what in policy terms should the government be doing to capture
the tide of support for a more integrated (intercultural) society which would give
direction or focus to the `motherhood and apple pie' menu outlined in Cohesion,
Sharing and Integration (OFMdFM, 2010)?
The 2009 survey poses several questions which provide more detailed insights into
cross-community contact and mixing. These questions probed respondents on their
attitudes to greater mixing and their preferences for integrated or segregated: living,
schools, working environment, leisure activities, and personal relationships. The
answers to these questions provide an opportunity to conduct an exploratory factor
analysis to see whether there are a number of dimensions in the data gathered on
cross-community contact and mixing which would help us to understand people's
detailed thinking. Factor analysis can also prioritise their preferences beyond the
superficial but overwhelming support for greater mixing expressed above.
A principal component analysis with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was carried out
on fourteen variables relating to respondents' views on a more mixed or integrated
society (see table 1). The Kaiser ^Meyer ^Olin (KMO) measure verified the sampling
adequacy for the analysis, KMO  0.79, exceeding the recommended value of 0.6, and
the Bartlett's test of sphericity w2(91)  4527.0, p5 0:001 indicated that correlations
between the variables were sufficiently large for a principal component analysis. An initial
analysis revealed the presence of four components with eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser's
criterion of 1 and, in combination, explained 57.78% of the variance. An inspection of the
scree plot justified the retention of four components for further investigation. To assist in
the interpretation of these components, varimax rotation was performed. The rotated
solution is shown in table 1 and illustrates a number of strong loadings. The variables
that cluster on the same components suggest the following order of preference to achieve
`` greater mixing'' or a more integrated (intercultural) society:
. Component 1: represents a preference for greater mixing in schools, work, and
where people live.
. Component 2: improved relationships with the `other' community (friends, relatives,
neighbours).
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. Component 3: more integrated living (work, neighbourhood and school).
. Component 4: more intimate relations with the o`ther' community (mixed marriages).
In summary, the data from the empirical analysis suggest a number of things.
People in Northern Ireland do not perceive it to be a normal civic society in which
all individuals are equal, where differences are resolved through dialogue, and where all
people are treated impartially. They are evenly balanced on whether they believe the
government is encouraging shared communities, where people of all backgrounds can
live, learn, and play together. The majority (88%) of people felt that better community
relations would result from more mixing of the two communities. When asked what
constituted greater mixing, they expressed a preference for: mixed schools, work
places, and housing; improved relations with the `` other'' community; more integrated
living; and more intimate relations (mixed marriages), respectively.
These ordered preferences make intuitive sense moving from greater mixing in the
daily activities of people at school, work, and where they live through integrated
lifestyles and ultimately mixed marriages. They also offer government the opportunity
to focus, in a prioritised way, on public and social policies based on empirical public
support for these ideas. Top of the list are two essential public services which are ripe
for reform but have so far received limited attention from governmentöeducation and
housing services in Northern Ireland. I offer two examples from these key services
which illustrate the potential for greater integration in response to the public prefer-
ences outlined above. What is interesting is that both examples were initiated and
largely funded by external organisations (Atlantic Philanthropies and the International
Fund for Ireland) rather than through mainstream government departments. The first
example illustrates a work-in-progress case of shared education and the second
describes an initiative to promote mixed housing, managed by the Northern Ireland
Housing Executive.
Table 1. Dimensions of a mixed/integrated society rotated component matrix.
Component
1 2 3 4
In favour of more mixing in secondary/grammar 0.840
schools
In favour of mroe mixing where people work 0.835
In favour of more mixing in primary school 0.811
In favour of more mixing where people live 0.793
In favour of more mixing in leisure/sports activities 0.785
In favour of more mixing in marriages 0.516
How many friends are the same religion as you? 0.750
How many relatives are the same religion as you? 0.711
How many neighbours are the same religion as you? 0.659
Prefer mixed or own religion workplace 0.771
Prefer mixed or own religion neighbourhood 0.708
Prefer mixed or own religion school 0.600
Most people mind if relative marries someone of 0.846
different religion
You mind if relative marries someone of different 0.704
religion
Notes: Extraction method: principal component analysis, rotation method: varimax with Kaiser
normalisation.
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Shared education
The education system in Northern Ireland is highly segregated along religious linesö
Protestant (controlled) schools and Catholic (maintained) schools make up most of the
education provision. Integrated schools account for approximately 6.5% of the school
population and there are a number of Irish-medium schools, mostly in the primary
sector, where children are taught through the Irish language. The churches exercise
considerable influence on the management of the schools as transferors and trustees
representing the Protestant and Catholic sectors, respectively, on education and library
boards and boards of governors. As table 2 illustrates, out of a total school population
of just over 300 000 children, 90% or more of all children attend either Protestant or
Catholic schools. Although the Department of Education has since 1989, under the
Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order, a statutory duty to ` e`ncourage and
facilitate'' the development of integrated education, its incremental growth has been
relatively modest. This is, despite the fact that there is evidence of its positive reconci-
liation effects amongst school children (McGlynn, 2007). As Hayes et al (2007,
page 454) note: ``attendance at a religiously integrated school ... has positive long
term benefits in promoting a less sectarian stance on national identity and constitu-
tional preferences.'' The integrated sector blames the Department of Education for
capping numbers in their schools and the minister for refusing development proposals
to build new integrated schools or transform existing schools. The department, in turn,
faces a dilemma in trying to facilitate the growth of a small integrated sector in the
midst of a declining overall market having regard to the adverse impact that new or
transformed integrated schools can have on other schools in the area.
Previous research (Brocklehurst, 2006; Gallagher, 2004; Hayes and McAllister,
2009; Hughes, 2010) has indicated the problems associated with separate schools in
Northern Ireland and the long-term effect on social attitudes. As Brocklehurst (2006,
page 92) notes:
‘‘The [separate] school is essentially a closed environment where potent sentiments
expressed between children can ramify their notions of religious difference, and
physical bullying and peer pressure can reinforce concepts of identity'' (cited in
Hughes et al, 2010).
The lack of significant growth in the integrated sector and the ongoing control which
churches exert in protecting single-identity education prompted external funders (Atlantic
Philanthropies and the International Fund for Ireland) to support an initiative entitled
Table 2. School types of pupils' religion in Northern Ireland [source: calculated from the Depart-
ment of Education (Northern Ireland) statistics 2009/10].
Protestant (%) Catholic (%) Others (%)
Primary schools
Controlled/Protestant schools 93 4.7 82.7
Maintained/Catholic schools 1.3 91.5 6.7
Integrated schools 5.7 3.8 10.6
Total 100 100 100
Postprimary schools
Controlled/Protestant schools 89.0 4.8 82.9
Maintained/Catholic schools 1.0 89.3 4.0
Integrated schools 10.0 5.9 13.1
Total 100 100 100
(n  56 845) (n  76 139) (n  14 775)
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the `Sharing Education Programme'. In 2007 they funded a three-year programme of
twelve partnerships composed of sixty schools and 2500 pupils in Northern Ireland
which collaborated on a cross-community basis to share classes and activities in order
to improve education outcomes for pupils.
The underpinning model (see figure 3) involves cross-community collaboration
based on sustained contact between pupils in the delivery of the curriculum in schools
(Donnelly and Hughes, 2006; Hughes, 2007). The intention, unlike previous community
relations initiatives in schools, is not to see joint activities as one-off extracurricular
events but rather to put cross-community working at the heart of the process via the
joint delivery of elements of the curriculum. Through collaboration, interdependencies
develop across traditional school boundaries in a way which is nonthreatening. As
a consequence, these boundaries become more porous and the distinctions which
underpin existing structures are less relevant. Creating interdependencies demands
rethinking the current system of autonomous school units with delegated budgets,
whose success is based on competition for pupils. Rather, a networked approach is
established offering mutual cross-community support. Parents endorse such collabo-
ration because it improves the quality of their children's education, and who the
provider is becomes less important to them.
At the end of the first phase of the Sharing Education Programme there has been
an independent assessment of its impact (FGS McClure Watters, 2009). Key findings
include the following:
. Those engaging in the Sharing Education Programme felt more comfortable in
having contact with people from a different community.
. There was a greater willingness amongst participants to make more friends with
pupils who belong to a different community background, both in school and outside
of school.
. Participation in the programme resulted in pupils gaining new experiences and
skills and increasing their level of confidence.
. Teachers concluded that participating on the programme provided direct educa-
tional benefits for pupils and afforded opportunities to build relationships with
pupils from different community backgrounds and cultures.
. Curriculum development has been enhanced as a result of the programme.
In a qualitative study of teachers delivering the Sharing Education Programme, one
comment captures a wide range of views held by those at the chalk face:
‘‘The impact of the Sharing Education Programme is that it gives our kids an ongoing
cross-community opportunity to meet regularly, to get to know each other, and to
lift the clouds of suspicion that may have existed. They now believe that it is okay
to be different and that it is okay to be yourself. I am convinced that those involved
in the programme will be more likely to challenge prejudices either in their homes
or beyond'' (Knox, 2010, page 31).
Teachers also highlighted the many common issues that young people face regardless
of their community background, which shared education can build on. Young people,
Establish
partnerships
Build
collaborative
links
Shared
classes
and
activities
Promote
economic,
education, and
reconciliation
outcomes
Figure 3. Sharing education model.
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for example, face pressures around drugs, alcohol, and social relationships. These
issues transcend ethnic identity and can become a unifying platform to develop trust
between pupils and a foundation for exploring more sensitive issues. Because of the
success of the programme external funders have expanded and rolled out the initiative
for a further three years throughout Northern Ireland involving around 150 schools
and 13 000 pupils.
Shared housing
The Northern Ireland Housing Executive is a nondepartmental public body within the
Department of Social Development with a key role in managing the stock of existing
social housing (some 90 000). The Housing Executive is ultimately accountable to the
Minister of Social Development and allocates social housing. This allocation process is
not driven by a value judgment on the part of the Housing Executive between inte-
grated or segregated housing but rather addressing need and accommodating people's
choice of where to live.(2) When faced with political instability and violence in the past,
people had felt a strong sense of security living within their own communities
(`amongst their own', to use the vernacular). However, as Murtagh argued, integration
offers a number of advantages in terms of `` social closure and mutual understanding,
the growth of accommodated living space and the practical housing management
benefits in the effective use of the stock, halting estate decline and providing safe
access to services, facilities and job chances'' (2001, page 783).
The Housing Executive recognised that community division and segregation pre-
vented it from making best use of existing housing and land and made an explicit
commitment in 2004/05 to support good relations through housing. One of its aims is
to promote mixed housing where it is practicable, desirable, and safe. The Housing
Executive established a Community Cohesion Unit to operationalise its commitment to
improving community relations. The unit works on five core themes: flags, emblems,
and sectional symbols; segregation and integration; race relations; interface areas; and
communities in transition (Gray and McAnulty, 2006).
More recently (2008), the International Fund for Ireland launched the `Shared
Neighbourhood Programme' aimed at developing thirty shared neighbourhoods across
Northern Ireland over a three year period.(3) The programme is led by communities
working together to create shared spaces (Goodlad et al, 2005). It provides training
and practical on-the-ground support through a dedicated team of cohesion advisers. In
addition to grants to run official cultural awareness and community events, participat-
ing communities receive community relations training, community consultations, and
support to design their own Neighbourhood Charter and deliver a good relations
programme (International Fund for Ireland). Some sixteen communities are already
involved after two years of the programme's operation.
This agenda was embraced enthusiastically by the (then) Social and Democratic
Labour Party Minister for Social Development (Margaret Ritchie) who saw shared
housing as central to her brief. In February 2008 she launched a new agenda for housing
in Northern Ireland aimed at tackling the acute housing problem.The scale of the problem
in stark statistical terms was set out as follows: over 38 000 people on the house waiting
list; over 20 000 people in housing stress; over 9000 people officially homeless; and,
average house prices over ten times average incomes (Ritchie, 2008a).
Central, however, to the delivery of this plan was the Minister's commitment to
A Shared Future (OFMdFM, 2005). She noted that the Programme for Government
2008 ^ 11 (Northern Ireland Executive, 2008) had been criticised for the absence of a
(2) See http://www.nihe.gov.uk
(3) See http://www.intrenationalfundforireland.com/index.php
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specific commitment to A Shared Future but made it clear that its principles would
inform her approach to the housing agenda.
‘‘The drive to increase affordable housing and shared neighbourhoods is close to
my heart. The `troubles' have created a legacy of communities living separately. A
shared future will not merely evolveöit must be built. Divisions must be bridged,
and as part of the new housing agenda, we aim to deliver as many newbuild social
and affordable housing schemes as possible, in which the occupants are from mixed
traditions and are signed up to a shared-future charter. The Shared Neighbourhood
Programme will assist more communities in their desire to live together and
involves communities and community organisations in 30 areas across Northern
Ireland'' (Ritchie, 2008b, page 120).
The minister's analysis was that although Northern Ireland had achieved a welcome
level of political stability it was a dysfunctional society which was deeply segregated
on sectarian lines where people lived, were educated, and socialised separately. She
reasoned that to overcome this dysfunctionalism three things needed to happen: poli-
tical stability, an improved economy, and social development. Shared housing was a key
element in social development which should be a catalyst for transforming society and
dismantling the institutionalised divisions and segregation that characterised Northern
Ireland (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). The minister acknowledged that a shared ethos
could not be forced.
To operationalise a shared future housing agenda the minister committed to deliver
as many new build social and affordable housing schemes as possible, where occupants
are from mixed traditions and are signed up to a `Shared Future charter'. The prototype
for this model was launched in Enniskillen (Carran Crescent), County Fermanagh
where families signed up to a charter for their community which ensures that no
more than 70% of any one religion is allowed. She also plans to convert many existing
social housing developments to shared future status. Alongside this agenda for change,
the minister committed to provided mixed tenure (private and social) housing as a way
of achieving social and economic integration. Murtagh's research on integrated social
housing concluded:
‘‘New cross-community governance arrangements and the rediscovery of civic
engagement are central to the sustainability of mixed housing schemes. But the
need to capture these ideas as a coherent policy that considers the various ways in
which integrated housing could increase choice and avoid segregation in different
housing markets is an urgent priority'' (2001, page 788).
Some time elapsed before integrated social housing became a priority and only then
when the twin factors of external funding and a Minister enthused by A Shared Future
converged.
The significance of these two initiatives in key public services, education, and
housing is that they illustrate the expressed preferences of people (from the survey
data) in action. Shared education and housing have been piloted through funding
from external organisations. Evidence is emerging that not only are these attractive
options for parents, children, and residents, respectively, but they also offer real
potential for a reconciled society in Northern Ireland [on links between education,
housing, and segregation see Clark (1998) and Clark et al (1992)]. A more integrated
society, at the heart of intercultural policy, is proving effective. This, in turn, poses an
obvious question as to why the devolved government is not more active in promoting
cross-community integration within public services.
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Conclusions
Does the wider research on community cohesion help us to understand what is
happening in Northern Ireland? While community cohesion has challenged the
whole notion of multiculturalism in terms of ethnic relations in Great Britain,
the circumstances of minority ^majority relations are different in Northern Ireland.
This relationship is not based on ethnicity but on ethnonationalism, although minority
ethnic relations have become problematic with the influx of new migrants. Cohesion,
Sharing and Integration may be less about a new approach or policies aimed at
promoting interculturalism and more crudely a political compromise brokered between
the two main power-sharing parties in the wider interests of embedding devolution and
stable government. It may also be about managing a divided society rather than about
tackling the root causes, part of the legacy of violence where reconciliation comes
before systemic changes.
The OFMdFM's 2010 consultation document Cohesion, Sharing and Integration
tells us little about how the devolved government in Northern Ireland will operation-
alise its goals. It is well meaning and replete with good intentions pitched at a very
general levelö`` we want a future based on sharing, equality, respect and understand-
ing'' were the two junior ministers' words at its launch. The document lacks priorities,
and accountability for delivery amongst government departments, and makes no refer-
ence to allocated funding. It is difficult to see how it will `` ensure good relations are
embedded within all government policy making'', one of its core themes for actions.
Drawing on public attitudes data, I suggest that people do not yet see Northern
Ireland as a normal civic society, express a high level of support for greater mixing
(interculturalism), and are split as to whether the devolved government is actively
encouraging shared communities. To do this, respondents have offered a hierarchy of
policy choices in moving to a more integrated society in Northern Ireland, from
greater mixing in daily activities of people at school, work, and where they live through
integrated lifestyles and ultimately much greater acceptance of mixed marriages.
Yet government-run public services have largely eschewed integrated provision and
tended to compound the status quo thus accentuating separation over sharing. The two
examples of innovation in education and housing provision outlined in this paper have
come from external funders. There is no suggestion that these provide the panacea for
shared communities but evidence emerging from these projects is encouraging thus
far. So why are politicians reluctant to embrace these ideas and mainstream sharing
(interculturalism) in public services in a very explicit way in Cohesion, Sharing and
Integration?
A number of factors seem plausible. While the public favour `greater mixing',
politicians may be less inclined. The empirical evidence that the public supports greater
integration in principle needs some qualification. As Shirlow and Murtagh (2006)
argue, there is a range of factors (beyond government policy) which may limit mobility.
People feel safe living in their `own' communities which have become self-sufficient
through duplicated public services (schools, leisure centres, health clinics, etc). This,
in turn, leads to a reluctance to shop and work outside their immediate areas. Their
economic circumstances, since there is a high incidence of social deprivation in inter-
face communities, will significantly limit their capacity to move to mixed areas. People
have also developed strong neighbourhood and family bonds within segregated com-
munities and may be reluctant to sever these kinship connections. Since the whole
raison d'eª tre for many of the political parties is based on ethnonational divisions, any
blurring of these boundaries could negatively impact on their support base. Despite
expressed public preferences for greater integration, the electoral support base for Sinn
Fe¨in and the DUP is strong.Voting patterns remain impervious to public policy issues
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because the legacy of voting on constitutional lines and fears of `selling out' still exist.
Yet a recent public statement by First Minister Peter Robinson that the education
system in Northern Ireland is `` a benign form of apartheid which is fundamentally
damaging to our society'' may indicate a shift in response to public opinion (Robinson,
2010, page 2).
Minor interventions in public services could make an enormous difference. For
example, the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 places a mandatory require-
ment on all postprimary schools to collaborate in the provision of a wider range of
subjects by 2013. From that date, schools will be required to provide pupils with access
to a minimum number of courses at Key Stage 4 (current target twenty four) and a
minimum number of courses at post-16 (current target twenty seven). In both cases at
least one third of the courses must be general (academic) and at least one third applied
(vocational/professional/technical). Inexplicably, the Department of Education has not
incentivised in any way cross-community collaboration in the implementation of the
extended education curriculum. Cohesion, Sharing and Integration offers a suitable
mechanism for the devolved government in Northern Ireland to meet the expressed
needs of the people for a more integrated society, but not in its current format. It has
merit because the consultation paper has the political imprimatur of the two largest
political parties in government but is limited in ambition and lacks implementation
details. Whether political self-preservation stymies the wishes of the public, remains to
be seen. The public, it seems, are more willing to embrace interculturalism than
politicians, many of whom still appear wedded to outdated ideas of `separate but
equal'.
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